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Although it has restrained inflation in member countries, the
franc zone does not appear to have worked well to channel
financial resources to efficient uses.
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In considering the merits of joining a monetary  of several small countries were pooled in a
umon, small countries naturally value  ihe  strong and independent Central Bank.
credible commitment to exchange rate and price
stability that membership represents - and that  Have these advantages been realized in the
would be hard to sustain by unilaterally pegging  CFA zone?
one's own currency.
Unfortunately, the experience has not been
Membership offers other potential advan-  encouraging.  Despite the fixed exchange rate
tages.  Within a monetary union, capital might  and an elaborate set of rules for avoiding over-
flow more freely to where it is most needed.  If  expansion of credit, the CFA zone has almost
the distribution of union benefits is reasonable,  foundered in widespread bank insolvency.
this could benefit all members - even those
who because of low capital productivity becane  The zone's institutional set-up seems
net lenders within the union.  equitable, but in practice the burden of paying
for losses is likely to fall disproportionately on
Moreover, the operation of monetary policy  the poorer countries - whereas most of the
and the prudential supervision of the banking  nonperforming credits have been made in somc
system might be more effective if the resources  of the zone's more prosperous countries.
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This  paper  has  benefitted  from  useful  discussions  with  P. Berlin,  G. Caprio,
M. Dailami,  P.  Dhonte,  A. Gelb,  L. Goreux,  M. Long,  R. Tenconi,  D.  Vittas  and
M. Wormser.1
MONETARY  COOPERATION  IN  THE  CFA ZONE
1 Introductlon  and  summary.
There  has  been  considerable  discussion  over  the  past  few  years  on the  merits
for  small  countries  of joining  a monetary  union. For  the  developing  world,
this  debate  has  centered  on the  experience  of the  CFA  or franc  zone  in
Africa. This  zone  is the  largest  and  most  enduring  of  currency  blocs. Most
of the  recent  policy  discussion  on the  CFA  zone  has  focussed  on three  types
of question:  competitiveness,  the  mechanics  of  bank restructuring  and  the
comparative  growth  performance  of CFA  versus  non-CFA  countries'.  The  focus  of
this  paper  is rather  different. It  4.s  designed  as a guide  to  understanding
how  the  zone  works  as  a mechanism  for  monetary  cooperation.
When considering  the  merits  of  joining  a  monetary  union  small  countries
naturally  value  the  credible  commitment  to exchange  rate  and  price  stability
which  membership  represents  and  which  would  be hard  to sustain  through
unilaterally  pegging  one's  currency 2. There  is  also  a potential  saving
through  pooling  of the  external  reserves  of  member  currencies.
But there  might  also  be other  advantages.  Capital  might  flow  more  freely  to
where  it  was  most  needed  within  a  monetary  union. Provided  the  distribution
of  benefits  of the  union  was reasonable,  this  could  be to the  advantage  of
all  members,  even  those  whose  low  capital  productivity  resulted  in their
becoming  net lenders  within  the  union. Furthermore  the  operation  of
monetary  policy  and  the  prudential  supervision  of the  banking  system  might  be
more  effective  if  the  resources  of several  small  countries  were  pooled  in a
strong  and independent  central  bank.
1 See,  for  example,  the  references  by Devarajan  and  de Melo (1987a  and  b),
Dittus  (1987),  Guillaumont  & Guillaumont  (1984  and  1988),  Krumm  (1985  and
1987),  Ouattara  (1986).
2 By  embodying  the  exchange  rate  decision  in  a multi-country  institutional
set-up  involving  a joint  central  bank,  each  member  country  commits  itself  to
an arrangement  from  which  would  be rather  costly  to exit. This
pre-commitment  enhances  the  credibility  of the  fixed  exchange  rate
arrangement  for  each  member. Pressures  on any  one  member  to  adjust  the
exchange  rate  will  be more  easily  resisted  by the  authorities  because  of the
sunk  costs  of  union  membershiR.  The  credibility  of the  exchange  rate
commitment  could  then  lead  to a  more  stable  monetary  and  inflation  evolution.
A companion  paper (ionohan,  1990)  provides  evidence  that  franc  zone inflation
has been  largely  determined  by French  inflation.2
This  paper  examines  whether  such  additional  advantages  have  been  realized  in
the  CFA  zone. Unfortunately,  the  experience  which  is  described  in this  paper
is  not arn  encouraging  one. Despite  the  fixed  exchange  rate  and  an elaborate
set  of rules  for  avoiding  excessive  credit  expansion,  the  CFA  zone  has almost
foundered  in  widespread  bank insolvency.  Although  the  zone's  institutional
set-up  seems  equitable,  in  practice  the  burden  of paying  for  the  losses
involved  is likely  to fall  disproportionately  on the  poorer  countries,  while
many of the  non-performing  credits  have  been  made in  some  of the  more
prosperous  countries  of the  zone.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows. Section  2 describes  the  member  countries
of the  zo.ie  and  points  out  in  particular  the  diversity  not  only  in their
economic  structure  but in  the  state  of the  financial  system. Some  countries
are  net  borrowers  within  the  zone,  some  net lenders. This  might  suggest  that
some  efficient  mechanism  is  in  place  to channel  investable  resources  ro  where
they  are  most  needed,  but this  is  not  the  case.  Section  3 shows  that  there
is  no effective  regional  money  market  and  considers  how this  might  be
remedied. In the  absence  of a  market  to  determine  the  regional  distribution
of credit,  this  must  be done  administratively.  Section  4 discusses  how
credit  has  been  distributed  between  the  member  countries  and  highlights  the
agvnmetries  which  have  arisen. While  temporary  fluctuations  ir,  export
receipts  have influenced  part  of the  distribution,  the  bulk  of available
credit  has  not  been  used  as a revolving  fund  to  meet  such  temporary  needs,
but  has increasingly  gone to  a few  favored  countries.  Again  this  cannot  be
explained  as a flow  to  where  funds  are  best rewarded,  as  much  of the  credit
has  gone to  banks  which  have  subsequently  failed. The  costs  of these  bad
debts  affects  the  distribution  of the  seignorage  benefits  of the  zone;
section  5 explains  how seignorage  is divided  in  the  unions  and  shows  how the
losses  may fall  disproportionately  on  non-favored  countries. Section  6
concludes  by considering  how the  recent  banking  crisis  has  revealed  the
deficiencies  in the  zone's  arrangements.
2  The  CFA  countries
The CFA  zone  is  made  up of two  separate  unions,  the  West  African  Monetary
Union (UMOA)  and the  courtries  which  have formed  the  Bank  of the  Central
African  States  (BEAC) 3. Though  not  all  of the  former  French  colonies  in
sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  joined  one  or other  of the  two  unions,  and  though
3 While  much  of  what is said  in  this  paper  applies  to  the  whole  CFA  zone,
some  of the  evidence  prouided  is  based  only  on experience  in  UMOA.3
there  have  been  defectionsA  the  current  situation  is  that  thirteen  countries
with  a total  population  of some  seventy  million  share  just two  central  banks
and  two  currencies.  The  currencies,  each  of which  is  known  as the  CFA  franc,
are  both  valued  at one-fiftieth  of the  French  franc,  &  peg they  have retained
for  forty  years. Along  with the  fixed  exchange  rate,  the  members  of the  CFA
zone  have traditionally  retained  an open  international  capital  market,  with
statutory  freedom  of  capital  movements  among  the  member  countries  and  with
France.
The  monetary  mechanism  in the  two  zones  has  been  characterized  by
- an annual  monetary  programming  exercise  which  determines  the  planned  growth
in  domestic  credit  in  each  member  country.
- implementation  of this  monetary  program  through  credit  ceilings  to each
government  and,  in some  cases,  to the  private  sector,  or through  ceilings  on
central  bank  refinancing  of private  sector  credit.
- administered  interest  rates,  including  preferential  rates  for  priority
sectors.
The  total  land  area  of the  CFA  zone  amounts  to  31%  of SSA,  though  its
population  is  only  16%  and  its  totaA  G.N' abu.  22  o,a L1'&L  iu  GA.  Tie
members  include  some  of the  poorest  countries  in the  world (chief  economic
indicators  for  the  members  are  shown  in  Table  1). All of  them  rely  heavily
on  exports  of a  variety  of primary  products  for  the  foreign  earnings  needed
for  imports  of necessities.  Most  are  also  heavily  dependent  on official
transfers  and  concessional  lendings.
It is striking  how  varied  the  CFA  countries  are. Some  are  open  to the  sea,
some  are landlocked.  In terms  of surface  area,  each  of the  largest  countries
(Chad,  Niger  and  Mali)  is  almost  fifty  times  the  size  of the  smallest,
Equatorial  Guinea. The  density  of  population  in  Togo  is almost  fourteen
times  that  in  Chad.  Per  capita  income  in  oil-rich  Gabon  is  estimated  at
4 Guinea  (Conakry)  abandoned  the  French  franc  on independence;  Mauritania  and
Madagascar  stayed  with the  French  franc  until  1973,  though  neither  joined  a
union. Mali left  the  Franc  zone  after  independence,  only  to rejoin  it  in
1967,  and  to  become  a member  of the  UMOA in  1984. Togo  was  not  a founder
member  of  UMOA either,  but  joined  after  a change  of government  in 1963.  In
1985  Equatorial  Guinea  became  both the  smallest  member  of the  CFA  zone  and
the  first  member  not  to  have  been a former  French  colony. Monaco  and  the
Comoros  Islands  are  the  remaining  non-CFA  members  of the  franc  zone  apart
from  France  and its  dependencies.
5 Official  development  assistance  to  the  eight  poorest  members  averaged  over
12 per  cent  of GNP in  1987.3  -a
TABLE  1: CIA ZONE - GENERAL INDICATORS
aUNKIN  COTE
UMOA  8DNIN  FASO D'IvOIRE  MALI  NIGER  SENEGAL  TOGO  UMOA
Population  (Mill.  tid-1986)  4.2  8.1  10.7  7.6  6.6  6.8  3.1  47
Area (O000s sq.km.)  113  274  323  1240  1267  - 196  57  3470
GDP (1986 - mill.S)  1320  930  7320  1650  2080  3740  980  18020
GNP per capita  (1986) - dollars  270  150  730  180  260  420  250  358
GNP per capita  growth  ('65-'86)  0.2  1.3  1.2  1.1  -2.2  -0.6  0.2  0
GOP grovth  Q-65-80)  2.3  3.5  6.6  4.1  0.3  2.1  4.5  4
GDP growth  (  80-  86)  3.6  2.5  -0.3  0.4  -2.6  3.2  -1.1  1
Avg  inflation  (t6S-'80)  7.4  6.2  9.3  ...  7.5  6.5  6.9  8
Avg  infLatLon  (C80-'86)  8.6  6.3  8.3  7.4  6.6  9.5  6.7  8
Life  expectancy  t  86) - years  50  47  52  47  44  47  53  49
K2/GDP  (Q65)  10.6  9.3  21.8  . 3.8  15.3  10.9  16
MZIGDP  ('85)  22.8  22.1  29.4  23  15.9  24.5  45.3  26
SUB-SARARAN
BEAC  CAR  CHAD  CAMEROON  CONGO  GABON  BEAC  AFRICA
Population  (Hill.  mid-1986)  2.7  5.1  10.5  2  1  21  424
Acea ('000s sq.km.)  623  1284  475  342  268  2992  20895
GOP (1986 - mill.$)  900  . - 11280  2000  3190  17370  165990
GNP per capita  (1986) - d4ollars  290  ...  910  990  3080  950  370
GNP per  capita  grovth  (  65- 86)  -0.6  ...  3.9  3.6  1.9  3  1
GDF grovth  (Q65--80)  2.6  0.1  5.1  5.9  9.5  5  6
GDP growth  ('80- 86)  1.1  ...  8.2  5.1  1.5  6  0
Avg  inflation  ('65-'80)  8.5  6.3  9  7.1  12.7  9  13
Avg inflatlon  ('80- 86)  11  5  . 11  7.5  4.8  9  16
T  I V....p-^-.~  *  PAs  !  - r--r  ~  - - - -5  ;  *2  ;;  5
z;/GOP  ('65)  13 5  9.3  12.5  16.5  16.2  14
;;2/GDP  ('85)  17 4  25.5  19.4  20.1  26.3  214
fifteen  times  the  figure  for  Burkina  Faso. Only in  regard  to  population  size
and  inflation  rates  does  the  range  of CFA  experience  fail  to  encompass  the
sub-Saharan  Africa  average  (Table  2)'. Even  here,  there  is  a  wide divergenc.
within  the  CFA  zone  with individual  country  populations  from  less  than  a  half
a  million  to  over  11  million;  and,  ths-ugh  long-term  inflation  trends  converge
around  the  French  norm (see  Honohan,  2190),  cumulative  1980-86  inflation
varied  between  32%  and  92%.
Exports  of CFA  countries  are  overwhelmingly  (over  90 per  cent  in  each  of the
countries)  composed  of  primary  products  or of lightly  processed  primary
products  such  as  vegetable  oils,  cotton  fabrics,  wooden  verters  and
fertilizers.  However,  it is significant  that  different  countries  depend  on
different  product  mixes. For  example,  for  the  se-  n countries  of the  UMOA,  a
listing  of the  products  which  directly  or indirectly  account  for  at least
7ive  per  cent  of  exports  (to  industrial  countries)  involves  fourteen  quite
listinct  products  (Table  3).
Since  the  member  countries  of  both  unions  (but  especially  the  UMOA)  depend  on
different  products  for  the  bulk  of their  exports,  and  since  the  prices  of
these  commodities  are  not  very  closely  correlated7,  there  is  substantial  scope
for  pooling  the  risks  of fluctuations  in  export  markets.
Reflecting  the  wide differences  in level  of  development,  the  range  and  number
of financial  institutions  varies  from  country  to  country  within  the  zone.
The  dominant  financial  institutions  are  banks;  the  non-bank  financial  sector
is  negligible.  Most  of the  largest  commercial  banks  are  at least  partly
government-owned,  often  with  key  management  and  systems  provided  by French
banks  which  are  minority  shareholders.  There  are  also large  government-owned
development  banks,  some  of  which  accept  deposits. As has  already  been
mentioned  and  is further  discussed  below,  banks  in  most  of the  countries  have
been  found  to  be insolvent.  This  applies  to a substantial  fraction  of the
banking  system  in  Cameroon,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Senegal,  Benin  and  Chad.
The  monetary  structure  of the  UMOA  countries  also  displays  wide  variations
from  country  to  country.  As  shown  in  Table  6,  many  of  the  CFA banking
systems  are  heavily  indebted  to  the  central  banks.  The  average  indebtedness
of  the  commercial  banks  to  the  central  bank  throughout  the  zone  in  recent
years  has  been about  one-third  of their  non-government  lending. There  are
6  And  even  for  inflation  the  median  of SSA  countries  is  within  the  CFA  range.
7  Table  4 shows  that  the  variability  of each  UMOA  country's  typical  export
basket  has  not  been strongly  correlated  across  the  countries  in the  1980s.4  -a
lable  2:  The  CFA  Countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa
SSA  Average CFA lo  CFA  hi
Population  density  (pop/km2)  20  4  36
Population  (million)  12  <1  11
Area (km2)  597  28  1284
Inflation  average  1980-86  %  16  5  12
Life  expectancy  at  birth (yrs)  50  44  58
Growth  avg  1980-86  1  0  -3  8
8 Shr  in  GDP:  Agriculture  36  10  50
Industry  25  13  54
Savings  (GDS)  11  7  30
Investors  14  9  37
Export  share  19  14  47
Govt.  cons.  13  9  26
Primary  prods  as % exports  57  21  96
%  of mfg  exports  to ind.  cners  34  11  82
Persons  per  physician  25  3  56
Sch  enrlmnt:  Primary  5  75  23  >100
Secondary  o  23  5  25
Agric.  share  in  workforce  a  75  62  87
Urbanizati^-  X  8  4
Infant  mortality  (per  C00)  113  75  144
Source:  World  Development  Report  1988; Data  refers  to 1986  or a recent  -.ear4-b
Table  3:  UMOA:  COMMODITY  COMPOSITION  OF EXPORTS
Burkina  Cote
Country:  Benin  Faso d'Ivoire  Mali  Niger  Senegal  Togo
Product:
Cotton  21  35  68  5
Coffee  7  25  40
Cocoa  16  36  14
Uranium  5  97
Phosphates  16  45
Fruit  and  Veg  7  7
Groundnuts  44






Note:  Table  shows  percentage  of each  country's  exports  to industrial  countries  of
various  commodities  and  products  manufactured  from  those  commodities
Onlv  commodities  accountinp  for  more  than  5%  of  total  exports  are  included.
Table  4:  UMOA:  VARIABILITY  OF EXPORT  PRICES
This  panel  shows  the  world  price  of each  country's  average  basket  of commodity  exports
Burkina  Cote
Benin  Faso d'Ivoi-re Mali Senegal  Togo  Average
1980  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
1981  97  82  81  86  110  93  86
1982  93  78  76  72  69  84  76
1983  92  87  86  82  86  81  85
1984  94  96  93  80  100  87  93
1985  87  91  89  69  85  79  86
1986  62  100  94  64  65  85  86
19P7  69  84  77  77  . 65  71  75
1988  58  81  70  71  85  72  72
Variance  227  63  88  104  234  77  72
This  panel  shLws  the  matrix  of correlations
Burkina  Cote
Faso  d'Ivoire  Mali Senegal  Togo
Benin  0.067  0.415  0.667  0.625  0.711
Burkina  Faso  0.927  0.206  0.130  0.474
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.385  0.292  0.693
Mali  0.679  0.681
Senegal  0.6084 -c
TABLE 5:  MATRIX  OF TRADo  PATTERNS  OF CFA COUNTRIES
2x103s?  (S o.  total *Mp.gts Of  ah  eeum2  as h*ag  ef  *OLu 
Total
5t1  NYO  cYv  3L6  PU  TJX  TCO  CAN  CAR  TCN  COO  CAR  CIA  TIA
AEN  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.1  0.0  0.1  0.u  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0
HVO  0.1  0.0  0..  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
C7V  3.3  28.9  0.0  23  3  9.8  4.2  3.4  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.4  4.2  0.4
fL7.  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
NEi  0.6  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2
S£N  0.9  1.2  1.t  6.4  0.C  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.2  1.1  0.1
TGO  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.t  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
CAN  0.0  0.0  2.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  19.5  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.4
CAR  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
TCH  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0
COo  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
GAS  0.0  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.4
CFA  4.9  31.3  6.3  ZO.2  12.5  4.7  0.6  2.4  0.3  21.0  1.0  2.4  0.0  .7
FRA  21.6  34.3  33.3  29.3  39.3  34.9  27.3  £3.0  59.3  30.0  53.4  53.0  36.7
CFA+FR  26.4  65.7  41.6  59.5  31.9  39.6  34.2  45.4  59.6  59.0  54.4  57.4  45.9
WoaLd  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
'MPORTS (I  of  total  Lmpotts  of the  country  at  head  of  column)
SucklCote  Total
DEN  HVO  CTV  &1  NELT  SEN  TOO  CAN  CAR  TC8  COO  GAD  CFA  RA
SEN  0.0  0.3  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.9  0  2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1
HVO  0.1  0.0  4.3  1.2  0.7  0  8  2  0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.1
civ  0.3  1.8  0.0  3.6  0.6  5 7  C  0  2.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.6  1.3  0.5
ML:  0.2  0.3  4.2  0.0  0.2  5  I  G.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.G  1.;  0.;
NER  1.5  0.8  1.2  1.3  0.0  0.4  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.1
SEN  0.0  0.0  1.8  0.3  0  0  0.3  0  0  0  0  0.0  0.0  0  0  0.3  0.6  0.3
TGO  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.1  0  7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
CAM  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.3  0.0  2.7  0  0  0.0  0.0  .0.6  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.6
CAR  0.0  0.0  0.0  0  0  0  0  0 0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
TCH  0.0  0.0  0.0  0  0  0.3  0  1  0  1  1.-  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0
CGO  0.2  0.0  0.1  13  0.1  1. 3  0.1  0  0  0.3  05  0.0  0.G  0.1  0.2
GAB  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.i  0  0  0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0  0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0  4
CFA  2.6  3.8  13.9  6.4  2.0  17  7  3.5  1.9  0.3  11.2  0.1  2.0  0.0  2  5
FRA  10.8  38.1  24.9  14.1  86  0  34.8  17.0  26  4  18  1  12  6  12.8  35.9  28.0  0  3
CFA*FR  13.4  42.0  38.8  20.5  90.0  52.3  20.4  30.3  18.3  23 8  :2.9  37.9  28.0  2 5
.orLd  :00.0  100.0  100.0  130.0  :00.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  :00.0  :^o 0  o  00.0  :30.0  :.0.0  ::o.04-d
Table  6
TA8ULU  CFA  COUTE  SII  MOVSYY  UJWY
End 1987
In  bition  of  CFA francs
Met  dxternel  0  tstic  Mony  Ctaim  Of Contrat  *in
Assets  Credit  (112)  Cuwreny on  Comecial  le*b
Bonin  -SS  106  97  20  49
Burkina  Paso  68  68  127  44  8
Cate  d,  oire  -378  1363  930  305  511
mati  X43  189  130  61  32
Niger  19  104  114  36  30
Sgal  -206  539  332  101  156
Togo  65  97  164  48  S
UNOA  -530  2466  1694  615  7I0
Canroon  1S0  939  678  .171  342
Cent.  Afr.  Rep.  18  48  60  41  13
Chad  9  la  ?6  4?  39
Congo  32  219  138  55  42
Equatorial  Guinea  4  11.3  9.4  7  4
Gabon  -33  384  238  49  29
BEAC  -192  1679  1199  370  4675
Just two  countries  (Togo  and  Burkina  Faso)  at the  other  extreme,  with the
commercial  banks  accepting  deposits  so far  in excess  of  what they  can
usefully  land  that  they  Dlace  substantial  deposits  with  the  regional  central
bank.  But in  most  of the  countries,  and  especially  in  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Senegal
and  recently  Cameroon,  lending  by the  commercial  banks  far  outstrips  deposit
resources,  with the  shortfall  being  made  up through  refinancing  by the
central  bank.  In  all  of the  countries,  direot  lending  by the  banks  to
government  is  small.
The  central  bank  in each  of the  two  unions  thus  provides  an intermediation
function  between  the  financial  systems  of the  surplus  and  deficit  countries.
One  way of looking  at this  is  to observe  that,  while  the  central  banks'  total
net  claims  on commercial  banks  is  of the  same  order  of  magnitude  as the  total
currency  issue,  three  countries  in  UMOA  and  one in  BEAC  have  commercial
banking  systems  indebted  to  the  central  bank in  an amount  in  excess  of the
national  currency  holdings. In effeec,  some  of the  resources  mobilized
through  currency  issue  in the  other  countries  are  being  channeled  to the
banking  systems  in the  other  four  countries. (The  central  banks  also lend  to
the  government,  their  overall  intermediation  role  is  discussed  further
below).
3  An union-wide  money  market?
In a single  country  the  financial  system  is  relied  upon  to intermediate
financial  flows  from  surplus  to  deficit  entities. Bank  and  non-bank
financial  intermediaries  and securities  markets  are  the  means  by which
savings  flows  reach  those  who  need to  borrow  in  order  to invest  in  real
resources  or in  order  to  meet  a temporary  excess  of consumption  needs  over
income. This is  not always  done  with  perfect  efficiency.  Various  market  and
institutional  obstacles  stand  in the  way.  For  example  informational
asymmetries  and  the  incentive  for  abuses  mean that  savers  do not  have  perfect
confidence  in  those  who  wish  to  use their  funds. Standard  financial
contracts  (such  as the  debt  contract)  do x&ot  always  divide  the  risks  between
lender  and  borrower  in  an ideal  manner;  contracts  which  might  be better  from
that  point  of  view  can  prove  to  be unenforceable.  All this  is  common  to  all
countries. The  challenge  for  the  monetary  union  is to  attempt  to ensure  that
financial  intermediation  works  as  smoothly  across  international  frontiers
within  the  zone  as it  works  within  each  member  country.6
National  frontiers  could  create  several  types  of obstacle  to  financial
intermediation,  including  controls  on foreign  exchange  movements,  risk  of
changes  in foreign  exchange  rates,  lack  of  knowledge  about  counterparties
associated  with language  differences  and  limited  trading  relations 8. Some  of
these  problems  are  well  dealt  with  by the  CFA  unions,  but some  are  not  and
the  net  result  is that  no effective  union-wide  regional  financial  market
exists.
Where  the  CFA  unions  do function  reasonably  well is  in the  area  of exchange
controls  and  foreign  exchange  risk,  though  even  here  there  are  problems. In
particular  it  has  not always  been as easy  in  practice  to transfer  funds  from
CFA  countries  to  France  in recent  years  as it  has  been in  theory 9. Transfers
of  funds  between  the  CFA  countries  are  much freer  especially  since  there  are
only  two  currencies  involved:  transfers  between  two  countries  of the  UMOA
involve  no foreign  exchange  transaction;  likewise  between  two  BEAC  zone
countries;  nevertheless,  there  is  always  the  residual  risk  that  a  member
country  might,  at a later  date,  impose  restrictions  on foreigners  attempting
to  repatriate  funds. The  fixed  exchange  rate  reduces  but  does  not  eliminate
the  risk  of foreign  exchange  losses:  balance  of payments  difficulties  have,
8 Note,  however  that  the  reliability  of  official  statistics  which  indicate  a
rather  low  level  of intra-regional  trade  (Table  5)  have  been  questioned  by
Yeats  (1989b). In line  with some  studies  of  colonial  relationships  (cf.
Austen  (1987)),  the  substantial  trade  with  France  has  Drompted  some  to
suggest  that  the  existence  of the  zone  provides  extensive  benefits  to France.
A recent  study  on these  lines  is  Yeats  (1989a).
9  There  are  some  limitations  which  mean  that  capital  is  not fully  free  to
flow  to  France.
First,  transfers  are increasingly  being  delayed  or even (in  some
countries)  refused  except  where  the  bank  can  provide  the  funds  abroad
itself. This  is  probably  the  most important  limitation.
Second,  banks  are  not  permitted  to  hold  more than  working  balances
outside  their  own  country. In some  cases  this  has  been stretched  to
imply  that  banks  must  always  use  to the  full  all  foreign  lines  of credit
avail  able  to them.
Third,  insurance  companies  are  only  allowed  a very  restricted  range  of
investment  possibilities  outside  their  own  country.
Fourth,  a transfer  fee  of 0.5%  has  been  payable  to the  BCEAO  on all
transfers  (for  current  or capital  gayments)  made  to France. This  hardly
discourages  flows  of  a long-term  craracter,  and is  said  to  be bypassed  by
many  banks  wherever  possible.
Fifth,  export  receipts  must  be repatriated  to the  exporters'  country.
(This  serves  to  block  one  possible  way of avoiding  the  transfer  fee).
Sixth,  there  have  been  requirements  to declare  export  of CFA  currency
notes;  these  however  are  largely  ineffective  as the  currency  notes  have
been  freely  acceptable  in  Europe.7
from time to time, generated market fears of a change in the parity.  For
capital between UMOA or BEAC countries those risks are smaller: after all,
one is dealing with a single currency and the scenarios under which
repatriation of the funds to another African country within the union could
entail an exchange loss are more remote.
Cotonou in Benin is about 2,500 km from Dakar in Senegal.  This figure,
together  with the fact that the UMOA is larger than India, gives some idea of
the geographical scale of the unions we are concerned about.  Over such large
scales the information flows necessary to build sufficient confidence to
allow borrowing and lending to take place efficient]y require the use of
trusted intermediaries.  In the present stage of development of CFA financial
markets this means that savings flows must be intermediated  by the banking
system.  Thus a saver in Dakar may trust  his local  banker; a bank in Cotonou
may have a creditworthy client.  Unfortunately, international loans within
the unions, even between banks, are virtually unknown.  (Even  w_thin a single
member country as developed as Senegal or Cote d'Ivoire the interbank  market
is very thin and confined to the leading banks only'O.) Accordingly, it is
unlikely, in the posited situation, that the Dakar funds will find their  way
to the  borrower in Cotonou.
The BCEAO does operate what is known as the "Marche  Monetaire", but this is
little more than the combination of a deposit facility for  banks, and a
facility for secured borrowing by banks from it and at its discretion.  Thus,
if a bank in Benin for example, has a demand for liquid funds it may not be
able to meet this demand from the marche monetaire even if it is able to
provide adequate security, and even if a bank in Senegal, for example, has
just placed surplus funds with the marche monetaire.
The BCEAO has not attempted to adjust interest rates to clear the domestic
market for bank liquidity"l. Furthermore, the gap between borrowing and
deposit rates in the marche has been as wide as one per cent per annum - far
higher than interbank spreads in a developed  money market.
10 The main reason for this has been the uncertain solvency condition of
several banks and the strained liquidity position.  In recent months even
some of tl  largest banks in Cote d'Ivoire  have found themselves  unable to
meet the-  obligations on the due date, a development which has encouraged
several banks to withdraw altogether from interbank lending.
11 For example, during a very tight period for the Ivorian  banks in January
1988, the marche monetaire interest rates were actually lowered in line with
interest rate movements in Paris, despite the  persistence of excess demand
for loans from the marche monetaire.8
The  situation  in  the  BEAC  zone  is  no  better;  there  is  no "marche  monetaire",
though  the  BEAC  does  accept  deposits  and  makes  loans. Once  again  the  loans
are  quite  discretionary  and  depend  on policy  considerations  other  than  pure
banking  prudence. The interest  rates  on loans  bear  no relation  to
market-clearing  rates.
In short,  it  has to  be said  that  there  is  no effective  regional  money  market
in the  CFA  zone. Under  the  present  circumstances,  the  easiest  way to
encourage  the  development  of one  would  be for  the  central  banks  to  act  as
intermediaries  matching  the  needs  of sound  deficit  banks  with the  supply  from
surplus  banks. In  view  of the  fragile  state  of the  banking  system  it is  more
than  unlikely  that  any  private  intermediary  would  undertake  this  activity.
After  all,  three  large  French  banks  have  affiliates  in  most  of the  CFA
countries,  yet  they  do  not  undertake  interbank  transactions  even  between
affiliates  in  different  countries.  Only the  central  bank  has sufficient
information  to judge  the  soundness  of  participant  banks. But  each  central
bank  must  also  manage  monetary  policy,  and  this  is  also  done  by  means  of
influencing  the  quantities  of bank  liquidity  in the  different  countries. An
institutional  framework  for  resolving  such  conflicts  would  need  to  be
devised.
For  example,  in  order  to  ensure  a separation  of the  functions  of monetary
control  and  international  intermediation,  one  arm  of the  central.  bank (call
it the  "monetary  policy  arm")  would,  as at  present,  be charged  with  planning
the  available  amount  of central  bank  credit  for  the  union  as a  whole.
Another  arm (the  "intermediation  arm")  would  match  supply  of and  demand  for
bank  liquidity  on the  basis  meeting  any  demands  from  sound  banks  presenting
acceptable  paper  as security. The intermediation  arm  would  accept  deposits
and  would  also  borrow  from  the  monetary  policy  arm.  The  latter  would  adjust
the  interest  rate  on its  loans  to  ensure  that  the  market  cleared,  i.e.  that
the  intermediation  arm  was  not  borrowing  more  than  the  planned  ceiling.
Having  a market-clearing  interest  rate  is the  key  to satisfactory  operation
of international  intermediation  within  the  union. Sound  banks  will not9
over-borrow  if the  interest  rate  is  not  subsidized' 2.
To summarize,  the  international  flow  of funds  within  the  UMOA  and  BEAC  unions
is  not  supported  by an adequate  institutional  infrastructure.  The  prevailing
risks  are too  great  for  private  markets  to  perform  this  function  given  the
information  at their  disposal. The  central  banks  of each  union  are  better
positioned  to channel  funds  from  surplus  to deficit  countries. At present
they  do this  without  explicit  reference  to  market  criteria;  they  should  move
to  a market-based  system  of  allocating  bank  liquidity  throughout  their
respective  zones,  whilo  preserving  monetary  control.
4  Monetary  policy.
Ideally,  the  available  credit  in the  union  should  go to  where  it  yields  the
highest  return. This  would  presumably  involve  flows  to support  domestic
expenditure  in  member  countries  faced  with  a transitory  balance  of payments
difficulties  resulting  from  adverse  export  shocks. On a longer  term  basis,
there  should  also  be a tendency  for  members  where  the  marginal  product  of
capital  was low  to  be net  lenders  towards  those  where  the  marginal  product  of
capital  was  high.  In this  section  the  process  of credit  allocation  is
reviewed  to assess  whether  it  flows  in  accordance  with these  criteria.
In order  to  protect  the  external  position  of the  union,  and  ultimately  to
ensure  the  sustainability  of the  fixed  parity,  the  monetary  authorities  avoid
creating  too  much  domestic  credit. In  practice,  there  is an annual  credit
planning  exercise  for  each  country  separately,  with the  individual  plans
being  simply  added  together  to obtain  the  monetary  plan  for  each  union. The
modelling  underlying  the  plan is  based  on a simple  standard  fixed  exchange
rate  quantity  theory  framework. Credit  creation  in  excess  of the  increase  in
money  demand  will spill  over  into  the  balance  of  payments  and  deplete  the
12  There  is  a long-standing  debate  over  the  appropriate  relationship  between
CFA interest  rates  and  those  in  Paris. As discussed  in  Honohan  (1990)  the
policy-determined  CFA  rates  have tended  to track  Paris  rates,  as would  be the
normal  market  tendency  considering  the  fixed  exchange  rate  and  the  relatively
open  capital  market. However,  because  of the  residual  risks  perceived  by
foreign  banks,  capital  will  not  always  flow  in  plentifully  in response  to  a
small  interest  differential.  Higher  interest  rates  may  sometimes  be
necessary  to allow  the  market  to choose  between  competing  uses  for  the
limited  funds  available  within  the  union.10
union's  reserves. Therefore  the  credit  plan is in  principle  designed  to
limit  such  excesses,  both  for  individual  countries  and  for  the  union  as a
whole3.
Broadly  speaking,  an expansion  in  central  bank  refinancing  of  bank credit
leads  to an  expansion  in  overall  bank  credit,  franc  for  franc. Although  the
money  stock  responds  to such  an increase  at first,  there  is  no sustained
increase  in  money  demane:  over  time  the  credit  expansion  leaks  out  into  the
balance  of payments 14.
Because  -here  are  no private  banking  flows  betieen  member  countries,  central
bank  refinancing  in one  country  will result  in an increase  in  bank  credit  in
that  country,  and  not in the  other  countries.  This  allows  the  central  bank
to  pursue  independent  credit  objectives  for  each  member  country,  as is  often
required  by IMF  programs. (If  a true  international  money  market  were
established  in the  unions  then  union-wide  liquidity  might  have to  be adjusted
in response  to  an emergent  overshoot  of the  credit  ceiling  in  one  country"5).
Among  the  factors  apparently  influencing  the  allocation  of central  bank
credit  between  countries,  at least  in the  short-run,  appears  to  be each
country's  export  receipts. In  particular,  UMOA  countries  who experienced  a
decline  in  the  value  of exports  (relative  to the  average  of the  union
13 In  view  of the  small  degree  of economic  interaction  between  the  member
countries,  there  are  no substantial  spillover  effects  of credit  creation  in
one  country  on  demand  conditions  in  the  others.
14 This  process  is  documented  in  Honohan  (1990). Other  factors  can  also
influence  credit  growth;  the  banks'  borrowings  from  correspondents  have  been
an important  factor  in  the  past.
15  Alternatively,  if  one  or  more  country  credit  ceilings  were  being  exceeded,
country-specific  reserve  requirements  could  be imposed  in  those  countries  to
choke  off  the  expansion  of credit. This  might  be the  best solution  if  it
were to prevail  only  for  a short  while. Sustained  use  of such  devices  would
serve  to recreate  a  wedge  between  national  credit  markets  and  impede  the
market  allocation  of  credit.11
experience)  have tended  to obtain  a  higher  share  of central  bank  credit 16. To
this  extent,  the  members  have  been  able  to  benefit  from  the  risk-pooling
afforded  by the  diversity  of export  products  in the  union. However,
efficient  pooling  of these  risks  requires  the  available  credit  to  be used  as
a revolving  fund,  with  borrowings  to cover  short-term  disturbances  being
repaid  in  better  times.
In fact,  not  all  countries  appear  to  treat  central  bank  credit  to  the  banking
system  as a revolving  fund. Somehow,  at least  in the  UMOA,  the  larger  and
more  prosperous  countries  have  gained  a  disproportionate  share  in the
regional  distribution  of credit. The  major  shifts  in the  distribution  of
credit  over  the  years  in  favor  of these  countries  have shown  no tendency  to
be reversed. Figure  1 shows  lending  to  banks  by the  BCEAO  expressed  as  a
percentage  of wide  money. The  upper  panel  of the  figure  shows  the  three
countries,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Senegal  and  Benin,  which  have  received  the  greatest
proportionate  share  rising  to  more  than  60  per  cent  of each  country's  wide
money  stock;  the  lower  panel  show  the  other  three 17, none  of whom  ever
received  more than  about  40  per  cent  of  wide  money  (less  than  20  per  cent for
Togo)  and  whose  credit  has  tended  to  revert  to  low  levels. Since  excessive
credit  expansions  have leaked  out  through  the  balance  of  payments,  this
skewed  distribution  of  credit  has  resulted  in  a skewed  pattern  of external
deficits  and  external  reserves,  with the  three  larger  countries  holding
disproportionately  low  gross  external  reserves.
16  Thus in  a pooled  cross-section  and  time  series  of seven  UMOA  countries  for
ten  years  (1978-87),  regressing  annual  changes  of each  countries'  shaLre  in
monetary  authorities  claims  on  banks  and  government  (L)  on the  fall  in its
share  of exports  (X)  gives  the  following  equation:
L - 0.428 X  RSQ-0.194  No. Obs. - 70.
(s.e.-O.105)
The  direction  of effect  is  as  predicted,  but  clearly  many  other  factors  play
a part in  determining  the  manner  in  which  central  bank lending  is  divided
between  countries,  as the  equation  explains  only  twenty  per  cent  of the  total
variation  in  the  lending  series. Since  the  size  of total  lending  is of the
same  order  of  magnitude  as total  exports,  we may  say  that  the  increase  in
lending  predicted  by the  equation  is  a  very substantial  fraction  of the  fall
in  export  receipts. Thus in  the  short  run  the  monetary  mechanism  provides  a
very considerable  buffer. Note,  however,  that  the  data  on monetary
authorities'  claims  on the  government  includes  the  counterpart  of IMF
drawings  which  are  channeled  through  the  central  bank  and  actually  provide
the  largest  part  of the  lending.
17  Mali is  not  shown;  it 'oined  the  union  in  1984.11 -a
FIGURE 1
COTE d'lVOIRE, SENEGAL  &  BENIN
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Cota  d'lvoire'm  share  of  union  GDP  has fluctuated  between  about  40  per
cent  and 55  per  cent in  the  period  1970-86  (with  its  share  of union
population  growing  from  23  per  cent  to over  27  per  cent).  Before  1980
Cote  d'Ivoire's  s are  in  union  external  reserves  fluctuated  between  22
psr  cent  and  62 per  cent,  but in that  year  it fell  below  7  per  cent  and
has  been  as low  as 1 per  cent,  it  share  has  never  recovered  to pre-1980
levels. A similar  pattern  is  noted  for  SaUgAJ and Rlin.  Ine  fall  in
these  three  countries'  shares  of external  reserves  was  taken  up largely
by Zags.  Although  Togo's  share  of union  GDP  has  been  falllng  from  only
about  7 per  cent to  about  5  per  cent,  and  although  its  share  in  union
external  reserves  never  exceeded  20  per  cent  before  1980,  since  1981  its
share  in  union  external  reserves  has  never  fallen  below  40 per  cent.
This  dramatic  shift  in  relative  shares  of the  union's  gross  external  reserves
corresponds  to  a disproportionate  allocation  of  central  bank credit  to  Cote
d'Ivoire,  Senegal  and  Benin. It is also  reflected  in the  net  external  assets
of the  monetary  system  (figure  2).  The  excess  credit  leaked  out  into  the
balance  of payments  resulting  effectively  in these  countries  indirectly
borrowing  from (poorer)  Togo to finance  imports. This  would  be unsurprising
on a temporary  basis,  but as it  has  been  sustained  for  many  years  it suggests
that  there  is  no adequate  mechanism  for  ensuring  that  the  resources  of the
union  are  treated  as a short-term  revolving  fund. The forces  for  repayment
are  extremely  weaks 8.
As already  suggested,  a permanent  pattern  of persistent  borrowers  and  patient
lenders  might  be justified  on the  basis  of  a higher  marginal  product  of
capital  in  the  borrowing  countries,  in  which  case  the  lending  countries  might
achieve  a better  return  than  if they  had  increased  domestic  expenditure.
However,  the  fact  that  much  of the  credit  has  gone  to  banks  which  have failed
proves  that  credit  has  not  sought  out  high-yielding  activities. Indeed,  the
financial  return  to  smaller  members  in  the  form  of central  bank  dividends  -
or seignorage  - will  have  been seriously  eroded  by these  losses. It is to
these  financial  returns  that  we now turn.
5  The  dLstribution  of seignorage.
Membership  of a  monetary  union  is  not  a zero-sum  game;  some  of its  benefits,
such  as those  of  price  stability,  are  public  goods  that  can  be enjoyed  by
all.  The  benefits  of seignorage  are  divided  among  the  members. This  section
explains  how seignorage  is  divided  and  shows  that  the  division  is  not  as
equitable  as it  may  appear  at first  sight.
18 In  contrast,  the  union  as a  whole  tends  to repay  drawings  from  its
overdraft  facility  at the  French  Treasury.12 -a
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Broadly  speaking,  seignorage  is  the  benefit  which  accrues  to the  issuer  of
money  by  virtue  of  being  able  to issue  interest-free  currency  rather  than
having  to incur  interest  charges  on  borrowing. The total  value  of the
currency  issue  in the  UMOA is  about  $2  billion,  in the  BEAC  zone it is  about
$1.3  billion. Most of the  benefit  of the  seignorage  on this  currency  issue
should  flow  to  member  governments  through  the  distribution  of BEAC  profits,
but some  is transferred  to those  who  are  given  subsidized  credit  from  the
Central  bank.
The  easiest  way to  trace  the  flow  of seignorage  is to consider  the  accounts
of the  central  banks. Taking  the  BCEAO  1986  balance  sheet  (Table  7)  for
example  it can  be seen  that  currency  is  the  largest  single  iteml"  representing
over  half of the  BCEAO's  liabilities.  The  principal  corresponding  assets  are
claims  on  banks  and  on the  national  treasuries,  the  latter  being  little  mcre
than  one-third  as important  as the  former. These  claims  are interest
bearing,  while  the  currency  is  not.  This  offers  a  margin  which,  after  the
operating  costs  of the  BCEAO  are  deducted,  represents  most  of the  flow  of
benefits  to  member  governments  arisinG  out  of seignorage.  The remainder  of
the  seignorage  is  passed  through  the  implicit  interest  subsidy  on government
borrowing  and  on some  of the  commercial  bank  borrowing  from  the  BCEA020.
The  most  natural  distribution  of seignorage  would  be in  proportion  to each
member's  national  currency  issue. In  accordance  with  the  UMOA statutes,
however,  the  BCEAO's  dividend  is distributed  equally  among  the  member  states.
Therefore  were it  not for  the  subsidy  on BCEAO  lending  rates  it  would  seem
that  we could  say  that  the  seignorage  is  divided  equally  among  the  countries
and  thus  represents  a  progressive  redistribution  from  the  large  (and  rich)  to
the  small  countries) 2 1. But  there  is  an important  caveat.
19 Excluding  the  IMF-related  items  and  the  miscellaneous  items  "comptes
d'ordre  et divers".
20  There  is  not  enough  published  information  to  make a  precise  calculation  of
each  of the  elements  in  the  seignorage.  Rough  approximations  based  on 1987
balances  and interest  rates  suggests  that  about  one-third  of the  flow  of  UMOA
seignorage  benefits  for  that  year  came  through  the  interest  subsidies. For
the  BEAC  the  proportion  was  more like  three-fifths.
21 The  rough  calculations  based  on 1987  suggest  that  Cote  d'Ivoire  could  have
taken  almost  30%  of the  UMOA  seignorage  flow  and  Senegal  16%. In each  case
the  take  was  not  greater  than  these  countries'  share  (50%  and 16%)  of total
currency  in circulation;  but it  was greater  than  would  be implied  by equal
distribution  (14%). Benin's  estimated  take  (12%)  was the  third  largest,  even
though  it  had the  lowest  share  of currency  in  circulation.13-a




IMF Reserve Position and SDRs  16
Foreign Exchange  135
(of  which Operations Account)  (95)
Claims on Banks and OFIs  596
Claims on National Treasuries  222
Operations on Behalf of National Treasuries  431
(of  which IMF and Trust Fund)  (399)
Fixed Assets, etc.  47
Suspense Accounts and Miscellaneous  341
Total Assets - Total Liabilities  1809
Liabilities
Currency  528
Claims of Foreign Banks, etc.  57
Claims of Local Banks and OFIs  234
Claims of National Treasuries. etc.  80
Transfers Being Executed  10
Obligations in Foreign Exchange  0
IMF, SDRs and Trust Fund  426
Capital and Reserves  107
Suspense Accounts and Miscellaneous  340
In billions of CFAF; US$1-CFAF 331.14
The caveat arises  because a large part of the BCEAO's lending to banks has
become  non-performing.  In Benin,  Senegal  and  Cote  d'Ivoire  in  particular,
the  BCEAO  holds  especially  large  claims  on insolvent  banks. Although  it
falls  to each  national  government  to  meet  BCEAO  claims  on insolvent  banks,
the  BCEAO  has  already  decided  to  consolidate  these  debts  at very  concessional
rates. As the  total  of the  claims  in  question  are  of the  same  order  of -
magnitude  as the  currency  issue,  such  concessions  will severely  dent  the  flow
of seignorage  benefits  coming  through  the  BCEAO  dividends. In fact,  by
making  some  very rough  calculations  on the  distribution  of seignorage  after
retrospective  account  is taken  of the  annualized  cosc  of these  concessions,
it  appears  that  close  to  one  hundred  per  cent  of the  seignorage  of recent
years  has  benefitted  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Senegal  and  Benin 22.
The  full  story  about  who  benefits  from  the  seignorage  therefore  becomes  a
combination  of equal  distribution  of  central  bank  profits,  subsidies  on
treasury  borrowings,  and  concessions  made  to individual  countries  in  respect
of  bank insolvencies 23. Though  the  smaller  member  countries  have  benefitted
over  the  years  by a larger  distribution  than  they  would  have  received  had the
distribution  been  proportionate  to  currency  issue,  they  will  now  suffer  by
the  equal  distribution  of losses  on  the  BCEAO's  portfolio. In the  end it  may
be that  they  will effectively  lose  all  of the  seignorage.
For  the  BEAC,  the  seignorage  analysis  is  more complex. The  distribution  of
BEAC  profits  is not  equal,  but  depends  on a formula  designed  to take  account
of the  actual  contribution  of  each  member  country  to the  profits  of the
22  Adjusting  the  estimates  mentioned  in  previous  footnotes  gives  these  three
countries  46%,  26%  and 16%  respectively.  These  calculations  are  very
tentative  as the  scale  of the  losses  is  not  yet fully  determined.
23  The  country-by-country  assignment  of interest  charges  on the  BCEAO's
operations  account  borrowing  at the  French  treasury  could  also  be relevant;
but  so long  as these  remain  mostly  as unpaid  book  entries  between  the  members
and  the  BCEAO  they  need  not  have  any  importance  and  are  not therefore
discussed  here.15
BEAC 24. Whatever  about  the  merits  of the  formula  in  normal  circumstances,  it
is  not  clear  how it  will  be applied  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  take  account
of  heavy  write-offs  on BEAC  loans  to  weak  banks. Therefore  it is too  early
to  judge  the  likely  distributional  impact  among  countries  of such  losses.
The  overall  conclusion  must  be that  the  arrangements  for  distributing
seignorage  have  been  vitiated  by the  failure  of the  central  banks  to  ensure
that  the  resot.rces  mobilized  by the  currency  issue  were invested  in  a sound
manner.
24 Some  70%  of the  profit  distribution  is  divided  on that  basis. A further
15%  is  distributed  in  proportion  to the  currency  issue  and  the  remainder
(15%)  is distributed  equally  among  the  members. In calculating  the
contribution  of each  member  country  to  profits,  interest  payments  to the  BEAC
from  a given  country  are  regarded  as  part  of that  countrY's  contribution  to
profits. Interest  earnings  from  outside  the  union  are  allocated  in
proportion  to each  member  country's  external  reserves. A detailed  critique
of the  formula  and  its  application  is  not attempted  here,  but it  is clear
that  it does  not successfully  mimic  the  distribution  of seignorage  earnings
which  would  prevail  if  each  country  operated  with  an independent  currency
issue. A rough  calculation  suggests  that  the  Central  African  Republic  and
Chad (both  of  which  have  comparatively  small  borrowings  and  are  among  the
poorest  of the  BEAC  countries)  are  the  most  disadvantaged  by the  formula.16
6 Concluding  remarks:  the  banking  crisis
Previous  sections  have shown  that,  although  the  CFA  zone  has ensured  a degree
of price  stability  over  the  long-run,  money  and  credit  policy  has  not  been
without  problems. The  distribution  of credit  among  different  member  states
has  not followed  market  principles  but  has  been  determined  administratively.
While  the  administrative  arrangements  are  not  obviously  inequitable  in
themselves,  the  UMOA  has slid  into  a  very  lop-sided  situation  where  three
countries  - the  three  most  prosperous  - have  received  the  bulk of  central
bank credit  and  much  bank lending  in those  countries  has  become
non-performing.  Between  them,  banks  in these  three  countries  have run  up a
net  capital  deficiency  approximately  equal  to the  average  currency  issue  for
the  whole  union  - a sum  not far  short  of $2  billion  or ten  per  cent  of the
union  GNP  for  one  year.  It is  as if the  central  bank  had  printed  the  entire
currency  issue  only  to  hand it to  non-performing  borrowers  in these  three
countries.
How  does it  arise  that  the  three  countries  with  the  largest  bank  insolvencies
are  also  the  countries  which  have  received  the  lion's  share  of central  bank
credit? It is  difficult  to avoid  the  inference  that,  for  all  the  talk  of
monetary  programming,  the  inter-country  allocation  of credit  has  been  driven
by pressure  to  finance  what  has  proved  to  be unsound  lending  by the  banks  in
the  most influential  countries. rerhaps  envisaging  such  an  eventuality,  the
statutes  of the  union  require  each  national  government  to  make  good  any
claims  of the  BCEAO  on an insolvent  bank 25. Despite  this,  the  governments
involved  have obtained  generous  rescheduling  terms  from  the  BCEAO  and  are
also  hoping  for  substantial  additional  concessionary  assistance  from
bilateral  and  multilateral  donors  to finance  the  debts.
If one  is to think  in terms  of  winners  and  losers,  so far  the  winners  are
those  who  benefitted  from  the  unwise  and  un-repaid  loans  made  by the  failed
banks. The  four  poor  countries  of the  UMOA  are,  so far,  losers;  their  claims
on future  dividends  from  the  BCEAO  are  compromised  by the  uncertain  value  of
25  This  provision  may  actually  have  encouraged  complacency  on the  part  of the
central  bank in  making  loans  to  unsound  or doubtful  banks,  as it  divorced
responsibility  for  losses  from  the  decision  to  lend  and  meant  that  the
central  bank  nad  no clear  incentive  to ensure  that  the  banks  to  which  it  lent
were sound. As a result,  the  central  bank  operated  bank  supervision  as if it
were  a disinterested  party,  merely  reporting  its  findings  to the  national
authorities  and  taking  no steps  directly  to  curb  bad  management  practices.
On the  other  hand the  provision  it  has certainly  not  been  effective  in
discouraging  governments  from  arranging  for  loans  to  made for  political
rather  than  sound  economic  purposes.17
its  claims  on the  failing  banks  and  the  three  rich  governments.  The
tentative  calculation  above  suggested  that  these  countries  have lost
seignorage  equivalent  in  capitalized  terms  to the  value  of  currency  in
circulation.
Perhaps  over-emphasis  on the  question  of  maintaining  the  parity  led  to
preoccupation  with  macro-economic  aggregates,  such  as the  total  amount  of
central  bank credit  in the  system  to  the  neglect  of the  prudent  distribution
of this  credit,  and  the  adequate  management  of  banks  in the  union. It is
even  possible  that  the  device  of a statutory  ceiling  on advances  to
government  (designed  to facilitate  the  credit  restraint  necessary  to  assure
the  exchange  rate)  provided  a false  sense  of security  and  led  to  neglect  of
the  growth  of  parastatal  and  government  influenced  credit.
On any  reckoning  this  is a  very  poor  performance  of the  union. It leads  one
to  ask  whether  alternative  statutory  framework  could  have  led  to a  more
favorable  outcome,  with the  resources  of the  union  being  distributed  in  a
genuinely  revolving  fund  to  meet fluctuations  in  external  needs  of individual
courtries  rather  than  being  systematically  channeled  to  a select  few. The
establishment  of a  more effective  and  market-based  mechanism  for  channeling
surplus  funds  would  help:  a true  "marche  monetaire"  where  solvency  of the
borrowing  institution  would  be the  sole  criterion  of whether  it  could  have
access  to funds  at a  market-clearing  rate.
In the  BEAC  there  are  also  serious  problems  of  bank insolvency,  though  in
this  case  the  evolution  of central  bank credit  has  changed  sharply  in  the
last  couple  of  years,  largely  as a result  of the  fall  in  oil  prices,  so that
it is  too  early  to  speak  in terms  of long-term  structural  inequalities
between  countries  in  the  BEAC  zone.
One  must  fear  that  the  very  unequal  distribution  of  economic  power  of the
member  countries  will  still  give  Cote  d'Ivoire,  and  to  a  lesser  extent
Senegal,  in  the  UMOA,  and  Cameroon  in  the  BEAC,  the  ability  and  incentive  to
continue  to  benefit  disproportionately  from  the  system  when it  has  been
recapitalized.  Perhaps  the  power  structure  of the  CFA  zone  would  be more
diffuse  if the  two  unions  were  to  merge. The  dominance  of  Cote  d'Ivoire
would  certainly  be tempered,  and  the  likelihood  of a four-way  coalition  of
the  prosperous  countries  working  to  the  disadvantage  of the  rest  would  seem
somewhat  remote. Each  of Cameroon,  Gabon,  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Senegal  might,
in that  wider  grouping,  provide  a check  on the  others.18
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